The inter-state dispute between Assam and Arunachal Pradesh remained one of the most complex conflicts in northeast India. This dispute can be traced back to the division of “Greater Assam” and the subsequent statehood of Arunachal Pradesh in 1987. The first official meeting was conducted in February 1969, and it was decided that the boundary should be surveyed by the Survey of India. The dispute has persisted for decades due to the absence of a mutually agreed-upon demarcation.
Over the years, multiple attempts were made for resolution, ranging from local administrative talks to the Supreme Court intervention and a central government-appointed commission, but no solution could be achieved. Disputed areas such as Kimin, Likabali, and Behali were often fuelled by competing territorial claims, local mistrust, and demographic shifts.
The situation was further complicated by historical ambiguity, outdated records, and political complications, which worsened the situation between the two states. The dispute isn’t only about land; it raises critical constitutional issues, especially those related to inter-state coordination.
The article explores the legal and constitutional dimensions of Assam- Arunachal Pradesh Dispute. It not only highlights the evolution and status of conflict but also the institutional challenges and frameworks needed to address such issues within a federal setup.[1]
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Assam and Arunachal boundary conflict highlights the following critical constitutional provisions:
- Article 3 – Parliament’s power over state boundaries
Article 3 grants parliament authority to form new states, rename them, or alter their boundaries. While it is required to formally consult with the concerned legislature, parliament isn’t bound to accept its opinion. [2]
- Article 131- Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
Owing to Article 131, the Supreme Court holds original jurisdiction over inter-state disputes involving legal rights. This provision authorised Arunachal Pradesh to file original suit No. 1 of 1989 against Assam. [3]
- Role of the Union Government & Article 263
Article 263 allows the creation of an inter-state council to facilitate dialogue and advice on boundary issues. The central government relied on this mechanism to form a consensus between the two states.
The legal framework laid down in articles 3, 131, and 263 of the constitution plays a crucial role in the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border conflict. While Article 3 gives authority to the parliament to alter state boundaries after seeking the views of the concerned state, though not required to act on them. Article 131 provides the Supreme Court with the original jurisdiction to hear inter-state disputes like the pending suit filed by Arunachal Pradesh in 1989. However, decades of litigation showcase that the judicial process alone may not provide timely solutions. Consequently, Article 263 allows creation of an inter-state council. It emphasises the importance of political dialogue to form a consensus between the parties. Altogether, these provisions underscore that resolving inter-state boundary disputes within a federal structure demands not only legal mechanisms but political consensus and effective administrative collaboration as well.
LEGAL HISTORY OF ASSAM-ARUNACHAL PRADESH BORDER DISPUTE
The boundary dispute between Assam and Arunachal Pradesh began with the division of “Greater Assam” in 1972, when the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) was separated to become a union territory and eventually became an independent state as Arunachal Pradesh in 1987. This administrative transformation raised concerns about territorial jurisdiction, particularly over the areas that lacked clear demarcation.
A major turning point came from the 1951 Bordoloi Committee notification. It recommended transfer of approximately 3,648sq.km of plain foothill from NEFA to Assam without taking the consent of tribal communities living there.[4] Arunachal Pradesh (then NEFA) consistently rejected this notification and argued that the transfer was unilateral and ignored customary boundaries. This disagreement remains the main cause for the present dispute.
As administrative tensions escalated, Arunachal Pradesh filed original suit No. 1 in the Supreme court in 1989, invoking Article 131 of the constitution. Despite being in the judiciary for decades, the suit remained pending for years, and this showcases the limitation of litigation in resolving inter-state disputes.
To find a way forward, both states agreed to initiate joint surveys
- A Tripartite Committee (1979-1984) was formed, and it demarcated about 489 Km of the boundary, but the procedure paused when Arunachal Pradesh refused to accept the final recommendations.
- Later, the Supreme Court appointed Local Boundary Commission (2006-2014), it examined ground reality. It gave a report in 2014 and suggested some recommendations, but the states didn’t act upon it.
Despite this structural legal intervention, the dispute persisted for years due to historical mistrust and inadequate ground verification. The friction isn’t merely legal it involves the livelihood, governance and identity of people.
2023 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING(MoU)
On 20 April 2023, chief minister of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh signed a MoU in the presence of union home minister. It is a landmark step toward resolving the boundary conflict over 123 disputed villages along their 800+ km shared boundary.
In Indian Constitutional law, MoUs between state aren’t treaties but a political agreement reflecting mutual consent. Their legal enforceability depends upon whether they meet the criteria of contract. In this case, the MoU established clear commitments that aimed to resolve the border dispute, maintaining the status quo and ensure that no fresh encroachments arise in the future.
The MoU offer both the states significant influence in resolving the dispute. The agreement can be presented in court as evidence of settlement intent under Article 131. The significance of the 2023 MoU goes beyond legal frameworks. It reflects a shared political will which is built on prior steps like the 2022 Namsai Declaration. Though not legislation, the MoU holds significant constitutional value. It exemplifies cooperative federalism and serves as practical mechanism for resolving a decade old inter-state conflict.
JUDICIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Court traditionally depends on ground data to examine territorial boundaries. In the Assam-Arunachal case, there was a lack of field-based surveys and it hampered effective judicial enforcement.[5] Though legal framework empowers courts to oversee the process, they can’t define borders without accurate surveys. Situations like these highlight the need for full ground-level verification.
Principles like audi alteram partem (all parties must be heard) are central to constitutional justice. Any administrative or judicial action on boundary issues must ensure local communities are informed and have real opportunities to participate in the decision. Failure to incorporate the voice of the local community in the Assam and Arunachal Pradesh dispute has undermined the legitimacy of the process and trust of people.
The executive and survey of India is empowered to initiate boundary demarcation, but their authority isn’t absolute; it remains subject to constitutional and judicial oversight. This balance played a significant role in the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh dispute. herein, the 2010 survey of India report was criticized for being based on outdated maps rather than physical ground surveys. Lack of practical verification weakened evidentiary value in the Supreme Court and intensified mistrust among the local communities. In Kimin, a town in Arunachal Pradesh, frequent administrative visits by Assam officials led to public unrest and deepened local tensions. These unilateral actions violated the spirit of cooperative federalism, and they also attracted legal challenge under Article 131. [6]
FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL PATHWAY
The Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border dispute highlights the urgent need to institutionalize a constitutional mechanism for inter-state disputes. Reviving the inter-state council could offer a structured platform for dialogue beyond negotiations.[7] In the long run, setting up a constitutionally mandated boundary would ensure that technical demarcation aligns with constitutional legitimacy and also leads to proper representation of people.
This approach will strengthen cooperative federalism, which is also seen in the state-led resolution of the Assam-Meghalaya dispute. Furthermore, past disputes like Assam-Nagaland highlighted that unresolved boundary issues often lead to long-standing legal limbo. Institutional coordination can foster peaceful coexistence, and in the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh dispute, this would mean taking a step toward constitutionally grounded solutions. [8]
CONCLUSION
The Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border dispute signifies fundamental legal and constitutional tensions between political agreements and formal adjudication. Although the 2023 MoU is a major step toward establishing trust through dialogue and political consensus but it is still a political instrument, and there is a need for a legally binding solution. What’s needed is an integrated strategy combining legal clarity, administrative coordination, and constitutional mechanisms to ensure harmony in India’s federal boundary framework.
[1] State of Arunachal Pradesh v. State of Assam, Original Suit No. 1 of 1989 (pending before the S.C. of India); INDIA CONST. arts. 3, 131, 263; Ministry of Home Affairs, Gov’t of India, Inter-State Border Disputes: Status and Efforts for Resolution (2023); Local Boundary Comm’n, Report on Assam–Arunachal Pradesh Border Issue (2014)
[2] India Const. art. 3.
[3] India Const. art. 131; State of Arunachal Pradesh v. State of Assam, Original Suit No. 1 of 1989 (pending before the S.C. of India).
[4] Bordoloi Committee, Report on the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) Boundary Demarcation (1951) (on file with Ministry of Home Affairs, Gov’t of India).
[5] State of Arunachal Pradesh v. State of Assam, Original Suit No. 1 of 1989 (pending before the S.C. of India).
[6] India Const. art. 131.
[7] India Const. art. 263; see also Ministry of Home Affairs, Gov’t of India, Inter-State Council: Composition and Functions, https://interstatecouncil.nic.in/.
[8] India Const. art. 1, art. 245–263 (providing the structural framework for India’s federal scheme and inter-state coordination).
Author: Himaani
Juris Centre 