Part I – Socio- legal Analysis of Contemporary Challenges

India, a mosaic of diverse faiths and cultures, is home to over 1.3 billion people practicing religions such as Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, Buddhism, and Jainism. As one of the world’s largest secular democracies, India presents a unique model of religious pluralism. While this diversity enriches the cultural fabric, it also creates challenges in ensuring religious harmony and protecting individual freedoms.

Articles 25 to 28 of the Indian Constitution enshrine the right to freedom of religion, including the freedom of conscience, the right to profess, practice, and propagate religion, and the autonomy of religious denominations to manage their affairs. Indian courts have played a vital role in interpreting these rights and distinguishing between essential religious practices and secular aspects subject to regulation. Despite these strong constitutional safeguards, the practice of religious freedom in India faces growing challenges. Rising religious nationalism, communal polarization, and violence against minority communities threaten the secular fabric.

Hate speech and communal violence, often tied to religious sensitivities, have increased, with 1,165 incidents recorded in 2024, up from 668 in 2023[1]. Historical events, such as the 2002 Gujarat riots after the Godhra train incident (1,044 deaths) and the 1984 Delhi anti-Sikh riots post-Indira Gandhi’s assassination (2,800–17,000 deaths), highlight the devastating impact of communal tensions. Recent incidents include the 2023 Haryana clashes during a religious procession, resulting in mosque attacks, and 2025 church vandalism in Uttar Pradesh’s Farrukhabad and Rajasthan’s Dausa. The Hadiya case (2018)[2] reaffirmed personal autonomy in religious choices, yet incidents like the 2025 Howrah church attack indicate ongoing challenges in protecting minority rights. These issues highlight the need for consistent enforcement of laws like the IPC and state acts, alongside clearer definitions of hate speech, to balance individual religious freedoms with public order in India’s pluralistic society. It challenge the constitutional guarantees of equality[3], personal liberty[4] , and religious freedom[5] under the Constitution of India. The Indian Penal Code addresses hate speech through Sections 153A promoting enmity between groups and 295A outraging religious feelings, though enforcement varies. The Court’s 2023 directives following Haryana’s Nuh violence emphasized proactive measures against hate speech, yet challenges persist, as seen in the 2023 Manipur violence, where over 500 churches were damaged and 70,000 people displaced[6]. Recent legislative measures, such as the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Activities Act, 2024[7], aim to curb activities inciting communal unrest, imposing penalties up to 7 years imprisonment for actions threatening public order.

India’s diverse religious landscape faces challenges from mass religious conversion practices, particularly in underprivileged and less-educated regions. These practices raise complex issues involving poverty, social discrimination, and the potential erosion of indigenous cultures, often sparking debates about coercion, genuine conviction, and communal harmony.

Social and Economic Factors

1. Poverty and Vulnerability: Economically disadvantaged communities, such as Scheduled Castes and Tribes, often live below the poverty line, making them susceptible to inducements like financial aid or necessities. For instance, Adivasi communities in Chhattisgarh, earning as little as $12 monthly, face extreme poverty, increasing their vulnerability to conversion offers promising better living conditions[8].
2. Lack of Access to Education and Healthcare: Limited access to education and healthcare creates dependencies on external entities, including religious organizations. Tribal areas, with high dropout rates due to geographic isolation and poverty, have lower literacy rates (58.96% for Scheduled Tribes vs. 72.99% nationally in 2011), making communities reliant on missionary or charitable groups offering these services[9].
3. Social Discrimination and Marginalization: Dalits and Adivasis face systemic discrimination, often excluded from social and economic opportunities. This marginalization drives some to seek alternative religious identities, such as Christianity or Islam, perceived as offering social equity or community support[10] .
4. Economic Incentives: Economic incentives, including cash, food, or employment promises, significantly influence conversion decisions. Recent incidents, such as alleged conversions in Uttar Pradesh involving monetary inducements, underscore how material benefits can sway vulnerable populations. Allegations of conversions through material inducements raise questions about coercion[11]. The Supreme Court in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P. (1977) upheld anti-conversion laws, distinguishing propagation from coercive conversion, emphasizing that Article 25 does not grant an unrestricted right to convert others (AIR 1977 SC 908).The promise of material benefits raises doubts about the authenticity of religious convictions. Critics argue that conversions driven by economic desperation undermine the constitutional protection of free conscience, as seen in cases alleging monetary inducements in Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh[12].
5. Impact on Indigenous Cultures: Mass conversions threaten indigenous tribal religions, like Sarna or Gond, practiced by millions. The shift toward Christianity or other faiths risks eroding traditional beliefs and cultural practices, as tribal communities increasingly adopt external cultural norms[13]. Conversions, particularly when perceived as coercive, fuel communal tensions. Reports of violence against Christians in Chhattisgarh and allegations of forced conversions in Assam highlight how such practices can escalate social conflicts, undermining India’s pluralistic ethos.

Controversial legislations and increased social discrimination have further strained religious coexistence. These tensions highlight the gap between constitutional ideals and on-ground realities, emphasizing the need for vigilance in upholding India’s pluralistic and inclusive vision of secularism. Anti-conversion laws in twelve Indian states—Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Karnataka, Haryana, and Rajasthan—regulate religious conversions to prevent coercion, fraud, or inducement, aiming to maintain public order. Anti Conversion laws protect vulnerable groups from coercive conversions, as seen in allegations of inducements targeting SCs and STs[14]. However, enforcement often disproportionately targets minorities, with cases like the 2017 arrest of three Christians in Madhya Pradesh and 16 in Uttar Pradesh in 2023 for alleged conversions[15] . The Stainislaus ruling’s failure to define “inducement” or “allurement” creates ambiguity, potentially conflating propagation with free speech under Article 19, undermining the constitutional intent to assure Christians’ conversion rights. Critics argue these laws restrict personal autonomy, limiting the right to change beliefs, a core aspect of Article 25, especially for marginalized groups using conversion as a coping mechanism. Arbitrary enforcement, often spurred by vigilante groups alleging “love jihad,” fuels communal tensions, with 165 attacks on Christians in Chhattisgarh in 2024[16] as affirmed in Safin Jahan v. Ashokan K.M. (2018), highlighting a tension between public order and individual religious freedom in India’s pluralistic society. Moreover the practise of “Bulldozer justice” generally refered, where authorities demolish properties of individuals accused of crimes, often without due process. The Supreme Court’s November 2024 ruling declared such demolitions unconstitutional, mandating a 15-day notice and judicial oversight, yet 2025 reports indicate ongoing violations. Critics, including Amnesty International, label this a “hate campaign” against Minority.

The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (CAA), marks a significant shift in India’s citizenship law by introducing religion as a criterion for naturalization. The Act expedites citizenship for undocumented non-Muslim migrants—Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and Christians—from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan who entered India on or before December 31, 2014. While the government defends the law as a humanitarian gesture toward persecuted minorities in Islamic states, critics argue that it undermines the secular and non-discriminatory foundations of Indian citizenship. From the standpoint of religious freedom, the CAA poses two significant threats. First, it implicitly links citizenship with religious identity, thereby potentially marginalizing a large segment of India’s Muslim population, fostering fear, and reinforcing a sense of exclusion. Second, it sends a symbolic message that religious minorities within India may not enjoy equal protection or recognition, thereby eroding the secular promise of equal treatment of all religions. The Act has also sparked massive protests across India, most notably the Shaheen Bagh sit-in led largely by Muslim women, and student-led demonstrations in major universities. These protests were not merely about citizenship law but represented a broader resistance against what was perceived as the communalization of legal and political institutions.

Part II – Constitutional Framework and Judicial Perception of the Right to Freedom of Religion:

The concept of secularism and religious freedom in Western history arose from the need to separate church and state, often advocating strict neutrality. However, in practice, especially in complex democracies like India, absolute separation is difficult. The Indian model of secularism does not insist on strict exclusion of religion from public affairs but seeks to regulate the religion–state relationship in a balanced and context-sensitive manner. The framers of the Indian Constitution adopted a distinctive form of secularism, grounded in Sarva Dharma Samabhava (equal respect for all religions). Instead of marginalizing religion, Indian secularism promotes principled distance—allowing the state to engage with religion to uphold values like public order, health, morality, and social welfare. This engagement enables reforms in religious practices when necessary for promoting equality and justice.

The Indian Constitution, through Articles 25 to 30, provides a robust framework for religious freedom while upholding India’s secular character. Article 25 ensures two key rights: freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice, and propagate religion. The Supreme Court of India adopts a broad interpretation of religion, encompassing beliefs, rituals, doctrines, and worship, reflecting the pluralistic ethos of Indian society where diverse faiths coexist. However, the Court limits religious practices to those deemed essential when they conflict with public order, morality, or human dignity, balancing individual rights with societal harmony.

In India’s diverse religious landscape, the Supreme Court’s principled approach promotes religious liberty while preventing infringement on others’ rights or societal stability. It may adopt a liberal stance, embracing varied religious expressions, or a conservative one, restricting practices to core tenets, depending on what best fosters freedom and dignity. The Constitution recognizes religion’s significance, positioning religious liberty as a fundamental value, but subjects it to societal principles like equality and non-discrimination.

The question of State authority over freedom of conscience is significant. Dr. Donald E. Smith argued that the State should have no control over this right, attributing Article 25’s restrictive language to poor drafting. However, these restrictions are intentional, prioritizing public welfare over individual beliefs when necessary, allowing limitations based on public order, morality, and health.

Article 25 works alongside Article 23, which prohibits human trafficking and forced labor while permitting non-discriminatory compulsory public service, such as military conscription. This service, deemed essential for citizen protection, overrides religious exemptions under Article 25, emphasizing collective welfare. Thus, the Constitution balances religious freedom with societal needs, ensuring individual rights align with public interest. The Supreme Court’s interpretations reinforce this equilibrium, fostering religious diversity while safeguarding human dignity and national stability in India’s complex social fabric.

The Indian Constitution does not define “religion,” but the Supreme Court has interpreted it broadly as encompassing beliefs, doctrines, rituals, and practices integral to spiritual well-being, as seen in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar (1954 AIR 282). In this landmark case, the Court struck down parts of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, for violating Articles 25 and 26, which guarantee religious freedom and denominational autonomy. The petitioner, the head of Sirur and Udipi maths, challenged the Act’s interference in the math’s financial affairs. Justice Mukerjea rejected a narrow, theistic definition of religion, adopting a broader view that includes practices, rituals, and even secular aspects like food and dress, integral to faith. The Court established the “essential religious practices” test, affirming that while the state can regulate secular aspects of religious institutions, such as financial administration, it cannot interfere with essential practices under Article 26(b) or completely remove a denomination’s right to manage its properties under Article 26(d). This ruling balanced religious autonomy with state oversight, ensuring responsible resource management without undermining pluralism.

In Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar (1958 AIR 731), the Court addressed bans on cow slaughter in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh, challenged by Muslim petitioners from the Quareshi community. They argued the bans violated their rights to practice religion (Article 25) and trade (Article 19(1)(g)). The Court upheld the laws, finding that cow sacrifice was not an essential Islamic practice, as alternatives existed, and the bans regulated rather than prohibited trade, aligning with Article 48’s directive to protect cows. The decision considered Hindu sentiments and communal harmony, setting a precedent for prioritizing public order and state interests over non-essential religious practices.

Historically, the Constituent Assembly debates on conscription revealed no exemptions for conscientious objectors, reflecting the state’s authority to prioritize public purpose over religious objections, as reinforced in State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar Singh (1952 AIR 252) and Somavanti v. State of Punjab (1963 AIR 151). These cases defined “public purpose” as actions benefiting the community, supporting state intervention in religious matters when necessary for societal welfare.

In Rev. Stainislaus v. State of M.P. (AIR 1977 SC 908), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam, 1968, and Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967. Appellants argued these laws violated Article 25(1), guaranteeing the right to propagate religion, and that state legislatures lacked competence under Entry 1 of List II, claiming the laws fell under the Union’s residuary powers (Entry 97, List I). The Court ruled that the laws fall within state authority to regulate public order, distinguishing propagation from active conversion. It held that Article 25 protects spreading religious tenets but not coercing others to convert, supporting state regulation to prevent exploitation. States like Uttar Pradesh (2020 Ordinance) and Madhya Pradesh (2020 Ordinance) require 60-day advance notices to District Magistrates, police inquiries, and impose penalties up to 7–10 years imprisonment and fines of INR 50,000–100,000 for conversions involving Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs), women, or minors.

In the Sabarimala temple case in Kerala[17], temple dedicated to Lord Ayyappan, historically barred women aged 10–50 from entry, citing menstrual impurity, formalized under Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Rules, 1965. Upheld by the Kerala High Court in 1991, this restriction was challenged in 2006 by the Indian Young Lawyers Association and five women, alleging violations of constitutional rights. In a 4:1 ruling, the Supreme Court declared the ban unconstitutional. Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justice A.M. Khanwilkar linked religion to human dignity, stating that gender-based exclusion violates the right to worship under Article 25(1). They ruled that Ayyappa devotees do not form a separate religious denomination, allowing state intervention for social reform under Article 25(2)(b). Justice Rohinton Nariman deemed the ban non-essential to the faith, rendering women’s worship rights ineffective. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud emphasized constitutional morality, rejecting menstruation-based stigma and extending Article 17’s prohibition of untouchability to gender-based exclusion. The Court struck down Rule 3(b) as unconstitutional.

Dissenting Opinion – Justice Indu Malhotra dissented, arguing that courts should not interfere with religious practices unless they involve extreme social evils. She viewed Ayyappa devotees as a distinct denomination, with the ban being an essential practice. Malhotra criticized the petitioners’ standing as non-devotees and warned that imposing external morality undermines religious freedom in a pluralistic society.

Criticism and Support: The judgment has sparked intense debate. Critics argue that it represents judicial overreach into matters of faith and tradition. They contend that the court failed to adequately consider the specific context and beliefs associated with the Sabarimala temple. Some fear that this judgment could open the floodgates for similar challenges to practices in other religions, potentially disrupting social harmony. Chief Justice Mishra and Justice Khanwilkar assumed that religion is inherently non-discriminatory and that allowing women into temples is an “essential practice” of Hinduism. This reflects the judges’ personal understanding rather than the devotees’ actual practices. The judgment didn’t sufficiently consider the perspectives of female Ayyappan devotees who supported the exclusionary practice based on their religious beliefs. The Court’s ruling was seen by many devotees as an outside intervention, especially since the petition was filed by a non-Ayyappan devotee.

In Aishat Shifa v. State of Karnataka[18]2022, the Supreme Court addressed Karnataka’s February 2022 Government Order banning hijabs in educational institutions with prescribed uniforms, citing public order and uniformity. The petitioners, Muslim female students, challenged the ban, arguing it violated their rights under Article 25(1), Article 14, and Article 21. The Court’s split 2:2 verdict. Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia striking down the ban as violative of fundamental rights, and Justice Hemant Gupta upholding it as a reasonable restriction highlighted tensions between state policies and religious practices. The case, referred to a larger bench, underscores India’s “principled distance” approach to secularism, allowing state intervention when religious practices conflict with public order or social equality.

Part III – Analysis of Essential Religious Practices Test

Essential Religious Practices (ERP) Test: The Indian Supreme Court addressed this issue in the Shirur Mutt case, ruling that “religion” in Article 25 encompasses all rituals and practices essential to a religion. This decision placed the responsibility on the judiciary to determine what constitutes an integral part of a religion. In doing so, the court implicitly rejected the “assertion test” used in the United States, where a plaintiff could simply claim a practice was religious without further scrutiny by the courts[19].

This process of determining essential religious practices often leads to unclear results and pushes the court into areas beyond its expertise. Nevertheless, this judge-made law now defines the scope of religion in India. The Indian Supreme Court’s method for determining which core religious practices are protected by freedom of religion under the Constitution is known as the essentiality test. The Supreme Court applies this test as follows:

1. It distinguishes religious matters from secular practices.

2. It confirms that the religious community in question considers the practice an integral part of its faith.

3. Even if a practice is deemed essential and integral to a religion, it may not be automatically considered “a matter of religion” if it’s found to originate from superstitious beliefs.

4. The Court carefully examines claims of religious practices seeking protection under Article 26(b).

Criticism of the Test – Despite its intention to protect genuine religious rights, the essential religious practices test has faced significant criticism. It is argued that this test often burdens individuals to prove the essential nature of their religious practices rather than placing the onus on the state to justify restrictions on religious freedom. Moreover, critics contend that judges, who may lack theological expertise, are ill-equipped to make determinations about what practices are essential to various religions.

1. Limited scope: The test focuses solely on determining which practices are “essential” to a religion, potentially overlooking the complexities of religious freedom and its interaction with other rights.

2. Judicial overreach: By deciding what constitutes an essential religious practice, the Court may be overstepping its bounds and assuming a theological role it’s not equipped for.

3. Avoidance of rights conflicts: The test allows the Court to sidestep complex conflicts between religious freedom and other rights by dismissing claims that don’t meet the “essential” criteria.

4. Undermining religious autonomy: It infringes on the constitutional right of religious communities to determine their own essential practices.

5. Oversimplification of religious diversity: The test fails to account for the heterogeneity of religious practices, especially in localized contexts, by forcing them into rigid categories.

6. Cultural disconnect: There’s often a gap between the judges’ understanding of religion and the lived experiences of religious devotees.

7. Potential for discrimination: By protecting “essential” practices, the test may inadvertently allow discriminatory practices to continue if deemed essential[20].

The Anti-exclusion test is a legal principle that emerged from the Supreme Court of India’s judgment in the Sabarimala temple case. This test represents a significant development in how the court approaches issues of religious freedom and constitutional rights. Here’s a detailed explanation of the anti-exclusion test:

Origin and Context: The anti-exclusion test was introduced by Justice D.Y. Chandrachud in his concurring opinion in the Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerala case (2018)[21], commonly known as the Sabarimala temple case. This test was proposed as a way to balance religious freedom with other constitutional rights, particularly in cases where religious practices result in the exclusion of certain groups.

Key Principles of the Anti-Exclusion Test:

1. Focus on Exclusionary Effect: The test primarily looks at whether a religious practice results in the exclusion of any individual or group based on characteristics like gender, caste, or race. Evaluate the impact of this exclusion on the constitutional rights of the excluded group. If exclusion is found, the religious group must provide justification for why this exclusion is absolutely essential to their religious practice.

2. Burden of Proof: If a practice is found to be exclusionary, the burden shifts to the religious group to prove that the exclusion is essential to the practice of their religion.

3. Essential Religious Practices: The test modifies the traditional “essential religious practices” doctrine. Instead of asking whether a practice is essential to religion, it asks whether exclusion is essential to the practice.

4. Constitutional Values: The test emphasizes that religious practices must be in harmony with other constitutional values, particularly dignity and equality.

5. Balancing Act: The court then balances the right to religious freedom against other constitutional rights and values

The anti-exclusion test introduced in the Sabarimala case marks a significant shift in how Indian courts approach religious freedom and constitutional rights. Its importance lies in refocusing judicial scrutiny from defending religious practices to examining their exclusionary effects, promoting inclusivity in religious practices, addressing discrimination justified on religious grounds, and evolving the interpretation of religious freedom under the Constitution.

However, this test faces several challenges. Critics argue it may lead to excessive judicial interference in religious matters, and its application can be complex, requiring careful assessment of what constitutes exclusion and its essentiality to religious practice. There’s likely to be resistance from conservative religious groups who may view it as infringing on their autonomy. Perhaps most critically, the test raises challenging questions about balancing long-standing religious traditions with evolving social norms and constitutional values. As this test continues to be applied and refined, it will likely remain a focal point in the ongoing dialogue between religious freedom and constitutional rights in India.

Future Implications: The anti-exclusion test has the potential to be applied in future cases involving religious practices that discriminate against certain groups. It could be particularly relevant in addressing gender-based exclusions in various religious contexts beyond the Sabarimala case.

Conclusion

India’s constitutional framework, rooted in the principle of Sarva Dharma Samabhava, provides a robust foundation for religious freedom, yet its implementation faces significant challenges in a diverse and polarized society. Rising communal violence, as evidenced by incidents in 2023–2025, alongside ambiguous anti-conversion laws and the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act, underscores the tension between individual rights and public order. The judiciary, through cases like Sabarimala and Aishat Shifa, has attempted to navigate these complexities, balancing religious autonomy with constitutional values of equality and dignity. However, the Essential Religious Practices test, while pivotal, risks judicial overreach and oversimplification of India’s diverse religious practices. The anti-exclusion test offers a promising shift toward inclusivity but requires careful application to avoid infringing on religious autonomy. To uphold India’s pluralistic vision, consistent enforcement of laws, clearer definitions of terms like “hate speech” and “inducement,” and judicial sensitivity to cultural and religious contexts are critical. Strengthening social and economic equity, particularly for marginalized communities, will further ensure that religious freedom is not undermined by poverty or discrimination, fostering a harmonious coexistence of faiths in India’s secular democracy.

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[1] India Hate Lab. (2024). Hate Speech Events in India 2024. https://indiahatelab.com

[2]Shafin Jahan vs Asokan K.M. on 8 March, 2018 AIRONLINE 2018 SC 1136

[3] Article 14 Constitution of India 1950

[4] Article 21 Constitution of India 1950

[5] Article 25 Constitution of India 1950

[6] United Christian Forum. (2024). Annual report on violence against Christians. https://www.ucf-india.org/

[7] Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Activities Act, 2024. https://www.uplegisassembly.gov.in

[8] Drolia, R. (2023, October 15). Adivasi poverty and vulnerability in Chhattisgarh. The Times of India.

[9] Census of India. (2011). Literacy and level of education. Government of India. https://censusindia.gov.in/

[10] Human Rights Watch. (2022). India: Marginalization of Dalits and Adivasis. https://www.hrw.org/report/2022

[11] Human Rights Watch. (2022). India: Marginalization of Dalits and Adivasis. https://www.hrw.org/report/2022

[12] Press Trust of India. (2024, January 10). Alleged conversions in Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. The Hindu.

[13] Singh, R. (2020). Tribal religions and cultural erosion. Journal of Indian Anthropology, 12(3), 45–60.

[14] Human Rights Watch. (2022). India: Marginalization of minorities. https://www.hrw.org/report/2022

[15] Press Trust of India. (2024, January 10). Alleged conversions in Uttar Pradesh. The Hindu.

[16] United Christian Forum. (2024). Annual report on violence against Christians. https://www.ucf-india.org/

[17] Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1690.

[18] Aishat Shifa v. State of Karnataka, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 842.

[19] Comm’r, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005

[20] Mustafa, Faizan, and Jagteshwar Singh Sohi. “Freedom of Religion in India: Current Issues and Supreme Court Acting as Clergy.” BYU Law Review, vol. 2017, no. 4, 2017, pp. 915-952.

[21] Indian Young Lawyers Association v State of Kerala 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1690

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Author: Sampada Awadhwal

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