It is a well-known fact that India’s constitutional framework reflects a uniquely evolved model of governance that is often characterized as cooperative and quasi-federal. While the Constitution delineates a dual polity with a distribution of legislative and executive powers between the Union and the States, it simultaneously vests the Centre with overriding authority in exceptional circumstances, most notably during national emergencies. This structural elasticity has historically enabled the Indian state to manage its immense socio-cultural diversity. However, the emergence of a multi-party system wherein divergent political regimes frequently govern at the Centre and in various States rendering the federal dynamic increasingly contentious and further leading to political heterogeneity which has not only complicated inter-governmental relations but has also, in many instances, disrupted the intended harmony of cooperative federalism, giving rise to persistent institutional discord.
The growing complexity and political friction have given rise to one of the most intractable constitutional challenges namely, the undue delay by Governors in granting assent to bills duly passed by State Legislatures, which has raised significant concerns regarding adherence to constitutional principles and the spirit of federalism.
In response to growing discontent over such delays, the Supreme Court of India passed a landmark verdict in 2025, delineating the constitutional boundaries of the Governor’s power to withhold assent and emphasizing that such discretion must be exercised within the framework of the Constitution and in a manner that respects the legislative autonomy of the States.
This Article aims to analyse the constitutional provision relating to assent to bills and access the impact of recent judicial pronouncements along with examing the political misuse and implication on Indian federalism.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING ASSENT TO STATE LEGISLATION
The Indian Constitution designates the Governor as the de jure executive head of the State, appointed by the President of India, and envisaged as a constitutional conduct between the Centre and the State.
“Under the cabinet system of Government, the Governor is the constitutional or formal head of the State and exercises all his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his council of Ministers, save in spheres where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to exercise his functions in his discretion”[1].
While the Governor discharges executive functions in accordance with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, save in circumstances where the Constitution expressly accords discretion[2], he simultaneously occupies a legislative position as an integral part of the State Legislature. In this legislative capacity, the Governor is entrusted with specific constitutional functions. Under Article 200[3] which stipulates for obtaining the assent of the governor for it to become law.
Article 200
when the bill is passed by the Legislative Assembly or in case bicameral, both houses, then it shall be presented before the Governor and the Governor shall either exercise one of the three options -:
- Assent the Bill
- Withhold the assent
- Reserve the bill for president’s consideration in special circumstances.
The first proviso of the Article lays down the procedure for withholding the bill, which states that the governor may when presented the bill to him as soon as possible return the bill if not the money bill and request for reconsideration and he may recommend amendments and if the bill is passed by the house again with or without amendment and presented to the governor again then the governor shall not withhold the assent.
The second proviso provides for the circumstance where the governor shall reserve a bill for the consideration of the president, any bill which, in his opinion would derogate the power and position of the High Court, that Court is by this Constitution designed to fill.
The supreme court has with time keeping in mind the increasing misuse of the power to assent bill by governor has interpreted the Article 200 for clarification.
The apex court in the case of State of Punjab v. Governor of Punjab[4], briefly explained the Article 200 of the Indian Constitution, where the court clarified the reason and the usage of the word “May” and “as soon as possible” the court stated that -:
- “The “may” in the first proviso is because the first proviso follows the substantive part which contains three options for the Governor. The first proviso attaches to the second option (withholding of assent) and hence begins with an enabling expression, “may”.
- The expression “as soon as possible” is significant. It conveys a constitutional imperative of expedition. Failure to take a call and keeping a Bill duly passed for indeterminate periods is a course of action inconsistent with that expression. Constitutional language is not surplusage.
As per Article 254[5] of Indian Constitution, any bill concerning the matter enumerated in concurrent list if made which is inconsistent with the law made by parliament or any other law for that matter upon being passed by state legislative can be reserved for president consideration.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONCEPT OF ASSENT TO BILL
The practice of granting assent to legislation finds its roots in ancient systems of governance, wherein the King wielded absolute authority to enact laws, and the community were bound to obey. Over time, as societies evolved, this absolute power was gradually replaced by representative legislative bodies composed of elected individuals. These representatives, although intended to reflect the will of the people, consequently, became increasingly susceptible to prioritising partisan interests over legislative integrity and the larger public good. In the ancient context, the assent of the king or queen to a proposed law served two principal purposes: first, as the legally competent authority, their assent was necessary to confer formal validity upon legislation, even after certain legislative powers had been delegated; and second, as the custodian of the public interest, the king was expected to ensure proper checks and balances on the legislative body to prevent the dominance of narrow party interests over the general welfare.
This historical practice of obtaining royal assent has a well-established constitutional lineage. In colonial India, the concept was first formally introduced through the Swaraj Bill of 1895, which proposed that the British sovereign would rule over India through a Viceroy, who would possess the authority to veto legislation passed by the Indian Parliament. This framework was subsequently institutionalised in the Government of India Act, 1919 and Government of India Act, 1935. Both the 1919 and 1935 Acts entrenched wide discretionary powers in the office of the Governor.
However, during the framing of the Indian Constitution, the framers deliberately omitted the phrase “in his discretion” to pave the way for a responsible form of government, one rooted in democratic accountability rather than colonial arbitrariness. The removal of such discretionary language signalled a strong establishment of will of the people as sovereign and constitutional democracy wherein unelected heads of State, such as the President and the Governor, were expected to act in accordance with constitutional norms rather than personal or political preferences. As constitutional scholar De Smith aptly observed with respect to royal assent an observation equally applicable to the Indian context “Refusal of the royal assent on the ground that the Monarch strongly disapproved of a Bill or that it was intensely controversial would nevertheless be unconstitutional[6].”
The 2025 Supreme Court Verdict: An Overview
The problem is not recent. The role and powers of the Governor have been a subject of constitutional scrutiny since the establishment of the Constitution. However, the comprehensive judgment delivered by the Apex Court undertook an in-depth analysis of the Governor’s constitutional position and powers, with the objective of offering both clarity and a workable solution to the persistent concerns surrounding the undue delays in assenting the bill.
The brief facts of the case are as follows: The State of Tamil Nadu being aggrieved by the action of the Governor in withholding assent to and reserving for the consideration of the President, by the Governor of 10 Bills enacted by the State Legislature has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking appropriate reliefs as prayed for in the writ petition.
The verdict offered a detailed examination of critical questions, where the court held that-:
- The whole provision of Article 200 must be read in totality. The first proviso to Article 200 prescribes a mandatory course of action and must be construed in conjunction with the substantive part of the Article when the Governor withholds assent to a bill. Neither the power of absolute veto nor that of pocket veto exists with the Governor or the President. The use of the expression “shall declare” in the proviso indicates that there is no scope for inaction; the Governor is constitutionally obligated to exercise one of the three options laid down under Article 200. There is one exception to this general rule when the bill can be withheld, when presented to him, in the second round is when the bill presented in the second round is materially different from the one presented to the Governor in the first instance. In such a scenario, it would be open for the Governor to choose from the three options provided in the substantive part of Article 200.
- Although Article 200 does not prescribe a specific time frame for the Governor to act upon a bill, this cannot be interpreted as allowing for indefinite inaction. Being the constitutional authority occupying high office must be guided by the values of the Constitution. They must look within and reflect whether their actions are informed by the Constitutional oath and the course of actions adopted by them furthers the ideals of the Constitution.
- The use of the expression “as soon as possible” in the first proviso makes it clear that the Constitution infuses a sense of urgency upon the Governor.
- The Court, while refraining from committing judicial overreach, nevertheless provided a time limit as a judicial standard to assess the reasonableness of delay. However, this time limit does not amount to a constitutional amendment.
- The court held under the second proviso of the Article 200, the governor shall reserve the bill for president’s consideration and must mention clearly the reason for doing so, in case the reservation of a bill by the Governor for the consideration of the President is on the grounds of peril to democracy or democratic principles or on other exceptional grounds then the Governor would be expected to make a specific and clear reference to the President properly indicating the reasons for such belief pinpointing the specific provision in this regard.[7]
Therefore, in the present case the reservation of the ten Bills was declared to be erroneous in law, non-est and thus, was set-aside.
The IMPACT ON FEDERALISM
India follows a model of cooperative federalism, wherein the governance framework is built upon coordination, cooperation, and interdependence between the Centre and the States. For this federal structure to function effectively, the constitutional boundaries of power must be respected by both levels of government. However, the rise of a multi-party system and increasing political polarisation has led to the growing influence of partisan considerations, thereby weakening the intended balance of power and cooperative ethos. One of the most significant manifestations of this erosion is the persistent delay by governors in granting assent to state legislation. Such delays reflect an implicit assertion of central dominance over state authority, undermining legislative autonomy and effectively paralysing the states’ power to enact laws, thereby blurring the constitutional demarcation between Union and State powers. The objective of Indian federalism is explained in the case of
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India[8] Federalism implies mutuality and common purpose for the aforesaid process of change with continuity between the Centre and the States which are the structural units operating on balancing wheel of concurrence and promises to resolve problems and promote social, economic and cultural advancement of its people and to create fraternity among the people
- Disrupting States Autonomy
Assent to a bill forms an integral part of the legislative process. The legislative structure in India comprises three main components. At the Union level, this includes the Lok Sabha, the Rajya Sabha, and the President of India. Similarly, at the State level whether the legislature is bicameral or unicameral the Governor functions as the constitutional head of the State and plays a crucial role in the law-making process. The Governor’s assent is a constitutionally mandated step that completes the legislative process at the State level. As held in the case of Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt Ltd. v. National Textile Corpn. Ltd and others[9]
“ The assent of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is considered to be part of the legislative process only for the limited purpose that the legislative process is incomplete without them for enacting a law and in the absence of the assent the Bill passed could not be considered to be an Act or a piece of legislation, effective and enforceable and not to extend the immunity in respect of procedural formalities to be observed inside the respective houses and certification by the presiding officer concerned of their due compliance, to areas or acts outside and besides those formalities”.
As the constitutional head of the state, it is the duty of the Governor to fulfil the constitutional obligations entrusted to the office and to uphold the Constitution in both letter and spirit. Article 200 of the Indian Constitution empowers the Governor to either grant assent, withhold assent, or reserve the bill for the consideration of the President. The use of the word “shall” in Article 200 imposes a mandatory obligation on the Governor to act upon one of the constitutionally prescribed options, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the proviso to the Article. However, instances of prolonged delay or inaction by Governors not only vitiate the legislative process but also undermine the authority of the State legislature, which is composed of democratically elected representatives. Such executive interference curtails the legislative competence of the State, thereby disturbing the constitutional balance envisioned under Indian federalism.
- Centralisation of Power
The Indian Constitution is widely acknowledged as one of the most detailed and comprehensive constitutional documents in the world. One of its core objectives is the division of powers between the Union and the States, as well as among the various organs of government, to maintain a system of checks and balances and prevent institutional overreach. This structural distribution of authority forms the bedrock of the Constitution’s federal character. As observed in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India[10], “the essence of a federation is the existence of the Union and the States and the distribution of powers between them.”
However, the emerging trend of delays by Governors in granting assent to state legislation—particularly the use of discretionary power to reserve bills for the President’s consideration without adequate justification reflects a disturbing shift toward centralisation of power. Such actions obstruct the legislative functioning of States and impose unjustified constraints on their autonomy. When Governors indefinitely “sleep over” bills without providing constitutionally valid reasons, it not only disrupts the legislative process but also signals an undue assertion of central influence over matters squarely within the domain of the States.
In NDMC v. State of Punjab[11], the Supreme Court emphasized that
As opposed to centralism, a balanced federal structure mandates that the Union does not usurp all powers and the States enjoy freedom without any unsolicited interference from the Central Government with respect to matters which exclusively fall within their domain.
The Administrative Reforms Commission (Study Team)[12] had similarly cautioned that a broad interpretation of Article 200 could result in an excessive number of bills being reserved for the President’s consideration, thereby undermining the federal structure envisaged by the Constitution.
Further, in Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India Ltd[13]., the Supreme Court highlighted the shift toward what has been termed a “centrifugal era” in Indian federalism—a period following the Bommai judgment, where judicial interpretations increasingly aimed to preserve and expand the autonomy of the States. The Court in Bommai firmly asserted that States are not mere appendages of the Centre, and any interpretative approach that undermines the constitutional powers of the States must be firmly resisted.
Suggestions and Recommendations
Maintaining the integrity of the Constitution is paramount, and safeguarding the federal structure is essential to preserving the democratic framework of India. In order to protect this federal balance, the following recommendations are proposed:
- The discretionary power of the Governor in granting or withholding assent must be exercised within strict constitutional limits. Except in rare circumstances where a bill is reserved for the President, the Governor is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Unchecked discretion undermines the authority of the legislature and distorts the federal balance. As the Sarkaria Commission[14] observed, in a parliamentary democracy, the formal head of the State cannot act independently of the real executive, which is accountable to the elected legislature.
- While the Commission recognised the importance of having clear timelines for the exercise of powers under Articles 200 and 201, it did not recommend any amendment to these Articles for incorporating specific time limits into the constitutional framework. However, in light of continued delays and the lack of enforceability of conventions alone, a constitutional amendment introducing a definitive time limit has become imperative. This would ensure accountability, reduce scope for misuse of discretion, and uphold the federal balance envisioned by the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The 2025 verdict reaffirmed the constitutional limits of the Governor’s powers, emphasizing timely assent to uphold legislative autonomy. Persistent delays undermine democratic governance and distort the federal balance. Strengthening legal safeguards and ensuring accountability are imperative to preserve the cooperative spirit of Indian federalism and protect the integrity of the Constitution.
[1] Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831
[2] INDIA CONST. art. 163
[3] INDIA CONST. art. 200
[4] State of Punjab v. Governor of Punjab, (2024) 1 SCC 407
[5] INDIA CONST. art.254
[6] Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831
[7] State of T.N v. Governor of Punjab2025 SCC OnLine SC 770
[8] S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1
[9] Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt Ltd. v. National Textile Corpn. Ltd and others (2002) 8 SCC 182
[10] S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1
[11] NDMC v. State of Punjab (1997) 7 SCC 339
[12] Department of Administrative Reforms & Public Grievances https://darpg.gov.in/en/panel/first-administrative-reforms-commission-reports (last visited June 15, 2025)
[13] Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India Ltd (2024) 10 SCC 1
[14]Inter-State Council Secretariat https://interstatecouncil.gov.in/report-of-the-sarkaria-commission/ (last visited June 15, 2025)
Author: Yashika Agrawal
Juris Centre 