The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, was passed by Parliament on 2 April 2025[1]  to regulate the immigration regime by consolidating and updating four colonial-era laws[2]. The government contends that the Act will “strengthen India’s borders” and “streamline the law governing immigration and foreigners”, aligning visa rules with contemporary needs. It strongly emphasises national security and regulatory clarity, whereas opponents see echoes of colonial-era exclusion. Further, it boosts India’s business climate and global connectivity.

Historical and Legal Context

The existing immigration laws heavily derive from British colonial legislation. For example, the Acts of 1920 and 1939 were enacted when India was still under British rule. The Foreigners Act, 1946, passed just months before India’s independence, and the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act, 2000, also reflect earlier legal regimes. These acts are originally designed for wartime surveillance during World War I and II, and retain most provisions till now. They lack modern digital integration and show overlapping of provisions.

Key Provisions of the Act

The Act introduces new rules governing passports, visas, foreigner registration, enforcement, and penalties. Its main features are as summarised:

1. Passport and Visa Requirements: The Act explicitly mandates that foreign nationals carry both a valid passport and an appropriate visa for entry or stay, implying that all persons entering or exiting India must hold valid travel documents[3] unless exempted under S.33[4]. Immigration officers may examine these documents at ports of entry[5]. The central government is authorised to designate specific ports or checkpoints for entry/exit[6], which immigration officers must staff. This codifies existing practice of visa/ETAs but emphasises compliance and electronic verification as part of the new digital system.
2. Bureau of Immigration: The Act establishes a new apex agency, either termed as the Bureau of Immigration or the National Immigration Authority, headed by a Commissioner who the Union government appoints[7]. This body will be charged with “immigration functions” (defining entry, transit, stay, and exit regimes) and supervise visa issuance. It will manage a centralised digital database of all foreign nationals[8]. Supporting officers include Foreigners Registration Officers (FROs) and Foreigners Regional Registration Officers (FRROs), who will oversee foreigner matters on the ground. This effectively replaces the current fragmented FRRO offices with a unified framework.
3. Registration of Foreigners: Under the older law, foreigners staying more than a  prescribed days must register with the FRRO. The new Act retains the requirement but emphasises digital registration. As of now, foreign nationals staying beyond 180 days must register online with the e-FRRO[9], but as per the new act, this will be replaced by the National Foreigners Registry (NFR)[10]. It mandates timely registration, and failure to do so is an offence. The Act also mandates reporting by hotels, airlines, carriers, educational institutions[11], and hospitals. For example, carriers must furnish passenger/crew information to authorities; universities must report international students; and hospitals must report foreign patients[12] and their attendants. These provisions aim to create a comprehensive information network on foreign movements within India.
4. Entry/Exit Controls and Surveillance: The central government can impose conditions on foreigners. Section 7 may restrict who enters India and how/where they enter or reside. Persons may be ordered to submit biometric data, identity proofs, or even undergo a medical examination. There are also provisions prohibiting a foreigner from associating with specified persons or engaging in specified activities[13]. In practice, these clauses give authority to monitor and control the internal movements of foreigners, ostensibly for security reasons.
5. Visa Categories: The Act formally creates several new visa classes tailored to modern needs. It introduces visas such as Startup Visa (for entrepreneurs), Skilled Talent Visa (for professionals in priority sectors), Investor Visa, Business Visa Plus (long-term business travellers), Transit Visa, and even a Digital Nomad Visa. These are meant to attract foreign capital, talent, and innovation. The existing categories are expected to continue, but under this restructured regime.
6. Integrated Immigration Management System (IIMS): The Act mandates the creation of a technologically advanced IIMS, which will link immigration counters at airports/land borders with the central database, using biometric identification and AI-based monitoring to track foreign nationals in real time[14]. It alerts officials if someone overstays a visa, exits unexpectedly, or shows suspicious patterns. It is intended to eliminate manual errors and enable pre-emptive alerts.

A critical dimension is the rise of biometric and algorithmic controls at borders. Amelung’s study of EU policy shows how an asylum database (Eurodac) expanded to give police access to asylum seekers’ fingerprints, normalising the “crimmigration” view of migrants as potential criminals[15]. The Indian Bill’s emphasis on digital identity similarly creates what some call biometric borders. In other words, the surveillance infrastructure, without checks and balances, can reframe migrants as security risks. 

• Offences and Penalties: Immigration offences now have stricter penalties. Entering without valid documents can result in up to 5 years in prison or a ₹500,000 fine (about US$7,000)[16]. Using forged documents may lead to up to 7 years in prison and fines from ₹100,000 to ₹1,000,000[17]. Overstaying or violating visa terms can incur up to 3 years in jail and a ₹300,000 fine[18]. Carriers transporting undocumented immigrants may face ₹500,000 fines and vehicle impoundment[19]. Previous laws had much lower maximum fines of ₹50,000 for passport violations. Hotels and schools not meeting reporting obligations may also incur fines.
• Enforcement Powers: The Act expands arrest and detention powers. Immigration Officers and even police, as low as a Head Constable rank, are empowered to arrest foreigners without a warrant for suspicion[20] of immigration offences. The Act also allows detention of “persons of a specified description” who threaten national security, sovereignty or integrity.

A key concern is that powers such as denying entry, restricting movement, seizing passports, and detaining suspects are granted to executive officers with limited judicial oversight. For instance, an analysis notes that a junior district officer could authorise indefinite detention of a foreigner deemed a security threat.[21] Sometimes, the immigration officer’s decision is “final and binding” in case of dispute without internal appeal[22].

Additionally, these terms are not clearly defined; the Delhi High Court has emphasised the need for a clear definition of the terms: “National security, sovereignty, public order and public interest must be of such a high degree as to offer a great threat. These concepts should not be devalued to suit the hyper-sensitivity of the executive or minimal threats to the State.[23]”

Constitutional and Legal Implications

The present Act raises some debates about its conformity with constitutional norms. Key legal issues include due process, equality, federal balance, and administrative justice:

1. Fundamental Rights: In our constitution, “foreigners” are not entitled to all rights. However, they are protected by core guarantees such as Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution. But, as per the critics, the Act violates Article 14 by granting open-ended “omnibus” powers to exclude foreigners on broad grounds like “national security” or “public health”. Though the apex court held that “ Government of India has power of the Government of India to expel foreigners is absolute and unlimited…[24]”, but the issue lies with broad undefined grounds. Clause 3(1) could bar entry of any person, including Persons of Indian Origin[25], based on undefined criteria that may arbitrarily target dissenters and thus contravene equality principles. Similarly, the lack of any statutory appeal or review against an immigration officer’s decision has been criticised as violating natural justice and Article 21.
2. Legal Safeguards: The Act’s detention powers raise concerns regarding Articles 21 and 22. Earlier, a detained foreigner could petition for bail or habeas corpus. However, under the new Act, migrants deemed security threats can be detained indefinitely without charge. There is a lack of a clear timeline for review of such detention, which is against the principles of fair procedure. The Act empowers the Bureau of Immigration to release detainees “if satisfied” conditions are met, but omits any judicial check.
3. Right to Privacy: The Act requires foreigners to submit extensive personal data, from fingerprints and iris scans to mobile location or financial information. India’s Supreme Court has recognised privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21[26]. While foreigners have fewer rights than citizens, courts have held that basic due process still applies to all “persons” in India. It is important to clarify whether the right to be forgotten will extend to non-citizens and to what extent.
4. Federalism: Immigration and foreigners are under the Union List[27]. Thus, Parliament has clear power to legislate on entry, visas, and borders. Nonetheless, implementation may involve state agencies (police, FRRO offices). The Act requires states to establish “Immigration Facilitation Centres” and coordinate with the National Intelligence Grid. However, no major federal dispute is foreseen, since sub-national governments cannot frame conflicting immigration policies. However, states may resist being conscripted into enforcement without commensurate resources or oversight. A similar resistance is observed in the case of the execution of the Enforcement Directorate, where some states raise doubts and even resist. 
5. Administrative Law: The Act raises questions of administrative discretion and accountability. The Immigration officers are granted quasi-judicial powers (to admit or expel foreigners) without any usual safeguards. The merging of executive and quasi-judicial roles violates fundamental principles of administrative law. Usually, such decisions by authorities can be reviewed by an independent body or court, but here the first (and only) check is a writ petition in the High Court. The absence of a special immigration tribunal or appellate bench (unlike in the U.S. or U.K.) concentrates power in the Home Ministry’s hands. Therefore, the concentration of executive and quasi-judicial power in the same hands, without proper checks, violates the rule of law, natural justice, and the separation of powers, all fundamental to administrative law.[28]

The constitutional critique highlights tension between the security of the state and individual rights, with the future of law depending on the execution and interpretation of Articles 14 and 21 by the judiciary, if any issue arises. 

Impact on Security, Human Rights, and Foreign Relations

The Immigration and Foreigners Act will likely affect India’s security apparatus, human rights record, and international relations.

1. National Security: The government asserts the Act will strengthen security by blocking hostile elements. It explicitly authorises denying entry to foreigners who “threaten national security, sovereignty or integrity”. In theory, this could pre-empt infiltration by terrorists or criminals. The streamlined data systems (IIMS, unified registry) promise better intelligence on who enters and how long they stay. These measures may help intercept known suspects more efficiently.

However, there are some risks, such as vague terms like “national security” being undefined. The Act’s broad discretionary clauses echo “global authoritarian trends” in immigration (like the U.S.[29]). If the executive uses these tools to target individuals, it may destabilise domestic consensus. Moreover, it is observed that overemphasis on controls usually diverts resources from other crucial/security aspects[30] (border fencing, intelligence gathering). The detention-and-deportation regime is expensive and could be misused; balancing its security benefits against potential blowback will be a key challenge.

• Human Rights: Independent observers worry that it could marginalise vulnerable migrants. Sanjay Hegde warns it “privileges those with access to documentation and legal assistance while penalising those without”[31]. For example, long-settled poor migrants lacking birth certificates (e.g. undocumented workers) could suddenly find themselves offenders subject to steep fines and detention.

Further, the requirement of biometric data and the constant surveillance also threaten privacy[32]. Additionally, considering the prominent digital divide with unequal access to digital resources and government schemes exacerbates the concern[33]. The victims of trafficking or persecution might fear registering at all, for fear of deportation. Human Rights Watch has noted a trend of targeting dissenters abroad, particularly with the revocation of visa privileges for overseas critics by Indian authorities[34]. This Act could impose stricter vetting on OCI cardholders, potentially leading to cancellation of travel privileges and suppressing free expression among the diaspora.

• Foreign Relations: Immigration laws always affect diplomatic relations. A strict new law may draw criticism from countries whose citizens find it harder to enter India. For example, if students from the U.S. or Australia suddenly require tougher vetting or face higher fees, it could provoke formal diplomatic queries. Conversely, the new visa categories (startup, investor) are designed to encourage foreign business and student flows to boost India’s soft power by attracting high-skilled professionals and entrepreneurs. The ability to process visas digitally and grant long-term business visas may improve India’s image as a progressive country.

One particular diplomatic issue is the management of visa privileges for Indians living abroad. The Act does not directly address the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) scheme, but its broad language on foreigners raises questions about even dual citizens. Technically, an OCI cardholder is a foreign national (since OCI is not full citizenship)[35]. If an OCI bearer is barred entry or detained under this law, that could alarm large diasporas in countries like the U.K. and the U.S., which have significant Indian-origin populations. Additionally, India’s citizenship and immigration framework has sometimes produced exclusionary outcomes, often privileging wealthier diasporas while marginalising vulnerable groups. Scholars like Jayal highlight how cultural and political biases influence who is included or excluded[36]. Therefore, any new immigration law must be viewed within this broader tension between inclusive nation-building and ethnocultural nationalism[37].

Comparative Analysis: US, UK, Canada

To evaluate the Indian Act’s uniqueness and strictness, it is important to compare it with immigration policies in other democracies:

1. United States: The U.S. immigration system is governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA, 1952) and subsequent statutes. It has a complex regime with multiple visa categories (employment-based, family-based, diversity lottery, asylum, etc.), and a quota system for permanent residency. The U.S. prioritises family reunification and skilled labour, and historically has not used points in the same way as Canada. Enforcement is handled by agencies like USCIS and ICE, under DHS. Crucially, the U.S. provides a formal adjudication structure: non-citizens facing removal can be heard by specialised immigration judges and can appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals[38]. The U.S. immigration system, even if criticised for harsh conditions, provides appeal rights and administrative courts. In contrast, India lacks a dedicated immigration judiciary. This centralises power in the executive, with limited checks.
2. United Kingdom: After Brexit, the UK implemented a points-based system in 2021[39]. All migrants, from both the EU and non-EU countries, must qualify for visas based on job offers, salary thresholds, or skills, earning points for criteria like job skill level, English proficiency, and salary. The UK also has special visas (Global Talent, Skilled Worker, Innovator, etc.), somewhat analogous to India’s Startup and Skilled Talent visas. The Home Office runs enforcement. Importantly, the UK maintains a two-tier tribunal system: first-tier Immigration and Asylum Tribunals hear appeals on many visa refusals and asylum rejections[40], and an Upper Tribunal for points of law[41]. While India favours executive discretion and administrative control with limited procedural safeguards, the UK system ensures legal appeal rights and relies on a transparent, points-based immigration model which balances enforcement with judicial oversight.
3. Canada: Canada’s immigration system is relatively liberal and integration-based. It uses a points-based Express Entry model and offers legal protections through its Immigration and Refugee Board. It gave priority to family reunification, refugee intake, and offered clear pathways to citizenship. In contrast, India’s regime is stricter, with a security-centric focus and minimal foreign influx in comparison to its population. The new Indian Act marks a shift toward more controlled and surveillance-driven border management.

In sum, while India’s reforms echo global trends (digitisation, new visas, focus on talent), they diverge sharply in due process. The UK and Canada have shifted toward points regimes emphasising objective criteria, whereas India’s regime remains largely discretionary. Empirically, such broad discretion tends to be applied unevenly. For example, Hegde illustrates how poor, ill-documented migrants, e.g. a Bengali-speaking Muslim worker lacking formal papers, would suffer harsh penalties (fines equaling years of income) or deportation under the Bill’s “illegal entry” clauses[42].

Conclusion and Recommendations

India’s Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, represents a landmark reform. However, the breadth of executive discretion and the reduced legal protections for migrants raise serious concerns. To achieve a balanced implementation, these are some recommendations:

1. Judicial Review and Appeals: Parliament or the government should consider amending the Act (or enacting rules) to provide internal appeal channels or review mechanisms. Even if the Act intends to keep court oversight as the last resort, an intermediate Board of Immigration Appeals or specialist bench (as exists in the US and UK) could filter cases and relieve higher courts. Explicit appeal rights would align India with democratic norms and reassure aggrieved parties.
2. Define Grounds Clearly: There are some vague terms like “national security”, “foreign relations”, or “specified descriptions” that should be defined through rules or guidelines to prevent misuse. Clearer criteria would help officers apply the law uniformly and reduce arbitrary decisions. Merolla and colleagues show that even the choice between words like “illegal”, “undocumented” or “unauthorised” influences public sympathy and policy framing[43].  This suggests the law should adopt neutral language.
3. Limit Detention Periods: Detention of foreigners as security threats should be time-bound and subject to periodic judicial review. The law must require a formal show-cause hearing after a fixed period (e.g. 30 or 60 days), with transparent procedures. This would safeguard personal liberty without unduly hampering enforcement.
4. Ensure Non-Discrimination: Administrative data (from IIMS or registration) should be audited to ensure enforcement is not skewed by religion, caste, or political views. The government could establish a civilian oversight body or a parliamentary committee to review any pattern of rights violations under the Act.
5. Privacy Protections: The massive data collection envisaged (biometrics, travel history, etc.) should be regulated by privacy safeguards. Personal data collected must be securely stored and deleted when no longer needed. India’s new data protection law could incorporate standards for biometric immigration databases.
6. Engage Stakeholders: The government should consult universities, hospitals, airlines, and community organisations to smooth out reporting requirements. Simplified forms and digital portals (with multilingual support) will help international students and tourists comply without undue hardship. Extensive training of immigration officers in foreign languages and human-rights principles would also minimise grievances.
7. Human Rights and Refugee Norms: India might express explicitly how it will handle refugees or asylum seekers, since the Act categorises all non-citizens as foreigners without recognising or differentiating vulnerable groups[44]. Adopting a clearer refugee policy (even if not treaty-bound) would demonstrate goodwill to the international community, especially when India wants to project itself as ‘soft power’ and to win the confidence of the Global South[45].
8. Parliamentary Oversight: Finally, the Parliament should maintain active oversight. Even post-enactment, an oversight mechanism (e.g. an annual report to Parliament on the Act’s implementation) would help ensure accountability.

The Act is a foundational framework whose legitimacy will depend on rights-based clarity, expert-informed safeguards, and balanced implementation.

---

[1] The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025 (Act No. 22 of 2025, introduced in Lok Sabha on March 11, 2025; passed by Rajya Sabha on April 2, 2025), available via PRS Legislative Research (last visited on June 19, 2025).

[2] The Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920; The Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939; The Foreigners Act, 1946; The Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act, 2000.

[3] The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, s 3(1).

[4] The Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025, as described in “Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025: What are the proposed laws and penalties on violation?” Economic Times – India News, March 11, 2025, available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/immigration-and-foreigners-bill-2025-here-are-the-proposed-laws-and-penalties-on-violation/articleshow/118880388.cms (last visited on June 19, 2025).

[5] The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, s 4(2).

[6] The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, s 7(1)(a)–(b).

[7] The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, s 5.

[8] The Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025, as discussed in “India Introduces New Immigration Bill” Envoy Global – News Alert, March 29, 2025, available at: https://www.envoyglobal.com/news-alert/india-introduces-new-immigration-bill/ (last visited on June 20, 2025).

[9] e‑FRRO Portal, Bureau of Immigration, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, available at: https://indianfrro.gov.in/eservices/ (last visited on June 21, 2025).

[10] Rao, Archana, “India’s Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025: What Businesses Need to Know”, India Briefing, March 18, 2025, available at: https://www.india-briefing.com/news/indias-immigration-and-foreigners-bill-2025-what-businesses-need-to-know-36567.html (last visited on June 20, 2025).

[11] The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, s 9.

[12] The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, s 10.

[13] The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, s 7(2).

[14] Compass by Rau’s IAS, “Immigration and Foreigners Bill 2025”, Current Affairs (updated Mar 28, 2025), available at: https://compass.rauias.com/current-affairs/immigration-foreigners-bill-2025/ (last visited on June 21, 2025).

[15] Amelung, Nina, “Crimmigration Control across Borders” 46 Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung (3) 151–177 (2021), published by GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27075121 (last visited June 24, 2025).

[16] The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, s 21.

[17] The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, s 22.

[18] The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, s 22(a).

[19] Govt plans ₹5 lakh fine, up to 5‑yr jail for illegal entry under new bill, Business Standard – India News, February 12, 2025, available at: https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/govt-immigration-foreigners-bill-illegal-entry-india-fine-jail-passport-125021200294_1.html (last visited June 21, 2025).

[20] The Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, s 26.

[21] Bhatia, Nikhil, “Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025 is not just an administrative update. It redefines who belongs — and on what basis”, Indian Express (Opinion, May 2025), available at: https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/immigration-foreigners-bill-2025-administrative-update-9931601/ (last visited June 21, 2025).

[22] Lok Sabha clears Immigration and Foreigners Bill; Amit Shah says India ‘not a dharamshala’, The New Indian Express – Nation, March 27, 2025, available at: https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Mar/27/lok-sabha-clears-immigration-and-foreigners-bill-amit-shah-says-india-not-a-dharamshala (last visited on June 23, 2025). 

[23] Union of India & Anr. v. Satnam Singh, AIR 2018 Delhi 72, ¶ 20 (Delhi HC, Jan. 12, 2018).

[24] Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, 1955 SCC OnLine SC 35.

[25] “Immigration Bill ‘violative of fundamental rights’: Tewari”, The Tribune – Nation, Mar 12, 2025, available at: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/india/immigration-bill-violative-of-fundamental-rights-tewari/ (last visited on June 23, 2025).

[26] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1 : AIR 2017 SC 4161.

[27] The Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, List I – Union List, Entry 52.

[28] Administrative Law, UNDP‑DOPT Training Module (New Delhi: Department of Personnel & Training, Government of India, 2021), available at: https://dopttrg.nic.in/otrainingStatic/UNDPProject/undp_modules/Administrative%20Law%20N%20DLM.pdf (last visited on June 24, 2025).  

[29] Barrucho, Luis, “Trump wants to end birthright citizenship. Where do other countries stand?”, BBC World Service, 14 May 2025, available at: [BBC article link] (last visited 24 June 2025). 

[30] Risk Remediation Explained: Remediating Risk for Cybersecurity, Splunk blog by Joe Hertvik (May 2024), available at: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/learn/risk-remediation.html (last visited June 24, 2025).

[31] Supra note 22.

[32] Ebelogu, Christopher U., Amujo, Oluyemi E., Adelaiye, Oluwasegun I., and Faki, Ageebee S., “Privacy Concerns in Biometrics” 7 IEEE-SEM (7) 1–6 (July 2019), ISSN 2320-9151.

[33] Mahendru, Apoorva, Mayurakshi Dutta & Pravas Ranjan Mishra, India Inequality Report 2022: Digital Divide (New Delhi: Oxfam India, December 2022), available at: https://ruralindiaonline.org/en/library/resource/digital-divide-india-inequality-report-2022/ (last visited June 24, 2025).

[34] India: Authorities Revoke Visa Privileges of Diaspora Critics, Human Rights Watch (17 Mar 2024), available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/03/17/india-authorities-revoke-visa-privileges-diaspora-critics (last visited 24 June 2025).

[35] Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) Cardholder FAQs, Ministry of Home Affairs (July 22, 2021), p. 13, available at: https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/OCIFAQs_23072021.pdf (last visited June 24, 2025).

[36] Jayal, Niraja Gopal, Citizenship and Its Discontents: An Indian History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

[37] Supra at 23.

[38] Board of Immigration Appeals, Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Department of Justice, available at: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals (last visited on June 24, 2025).

[39] The UK’s points-based immigration system: information for EU, EEA and Swiss citizens, Gov.UK (last updated 9 Sep 2023), available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-uks-points-based-immigration-system-information-for-eu-citizens (last visited on 24 June 2025).

[40] Appeal against a visa or immigration decision: Overview, GOV.UK (13 years ago; last updated), available at: https://www.gov.uk/immigration-asylum-tribunal (last visited 24 June 2025). 

[41] Upper Tribunal (Immigration & Asylum Chamber), Judiciary of England and Wales, available at: https://www.judiciary.uk/courts-and-tribunals/tribunals/upper-tribunal/upper-tribunal-immigration-and-asylum-chamber/ (last visited June 24, 2025). 

[42] Supra at 23.

[43] Merolla, Jennifer, Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick, and Haynes, Chris, “Illegal, ‘Undocumented,’ or ‘Unauthorized’: Equivalency Frames, Issue Frames, and Public Opinion on Immigration” 11 Periectives on Politics 789–807 (Sept. 2013), published by the American Political Science Association, available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43279647 (last visited June 24, 2025).

[44] Bhat, Mohsin Alam, “Irregularizing Citizenship in India” Verfassungsblog (22 Nov 2021), available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/os2-irregularizing/ (last visited June 19, 2025).

[45] Bhatia, Rajiv, “India trying to leverage soft power for the Global South as G20 summit looms large”, Deccan Herald, (Published approx. 2.3 years ago), available at: https://www.deccanherald.com/india/india-trying-to-leverage-soft-power-for-the-global-south-as-g20-summit-looms-large-1193358.html (last visited June 24 2025). 

---

Author: Alok Singh

---